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Behavioral Constraints on the Design of 
 Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms†
By Ernst Fehr, Michael Powell, and Tom Wilkening*
We study  subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that
have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. 
We show that these mechanisms, which are based on  off-equilibrium 
arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the inappro-
priate use of arbitration, have severe behavioral constraints because 
the fines induce retaliation against legitimate uses of arbitration. 
Incorporating reciprocity preferences into the theory explains the 
observed behavioral patterns and helps us develop a new mecha-
nism that is more robust and achieves high rates of  truth-telling and 
efficiency. Our results highlight the importance of tailoring imple-
mentation mechanisms to the underlying behavioral environment. 
(JEL C92, D44, D82, D86, D91)
Incomplete contracts pervade economic and political life. Politicians in executive 
positions as well as bureaucrats in ministries and agencies act on the basis of loose 
objectives, and the obligations of employees and managers in private organizations 
are often described in vague terms. Economists have explored the implications of 
incomplete contracts by developing models that assume that key  payoff-relevant 
information is observable but not verifiable by a  third-party enforcer.1 Such 
observable but  nonverifiable information implies that  third-party enforcement of 
 state-contingent contracts is infeasible and that formal contracting is ineffective.
1 The assumption has been used to understand property rights and firm boundaries (Grossman and Hart 1986,
Hart and Moore 1990, Hart 1995), the optimal scope of governments (Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997; Besley and
Ghatak 2001), problems of privatization (Schmidt 1996a, b), the control of insiders by outsiders through voting
rights (Grossman and Hart 1988, Gromb 1993) or financial contracts (Aghion and Bolton 1992, Dewatripont and
Tirole 1994, Hart and Moore 1998), and patterns of international trade and technology adoption (Antràs 2003;
Nunn 2007; Acemoglu, Antràs, and Helpman 2007).
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The tractable nature of models using the assumption of observable but 
 nonverifiable information has made them an essential tool for evaluating  trade-offs 
in institutional design. However, despite its widespread influence, the assumption 
that  payoff-relevant information is observable but  nonverifiable stands on contro-
versial theoretical foundations. Building on work by Moore and Repullo (1988), 
Maskin and Tirole (1999) show that if parties commonly observe  payoff-relevant 
information, there often exists an auxiliary  extensive-form mechanism that induces 
truthful revelation of the relevant information in the unique subgame-perfect equi-
librium of the game generated by the mechanism.
Maskin and Tirole’s critique of the microfoundations of incomplete contracting 
models that use the  observable-but-nonverifiable information assumption is troubling 
because it implies that the payoffs that are attainable with verifiable variables are also 
attainable with variables that are only commonly observable. Comparing the effec-
tiveness of  second-best institutional arrangements under incomplete contracts is moot 
when a mechanism exists that is capable of achieving the same payoffs as the best 
contract with verifiable information. However, the very limited use of implementation 
mechanisms leads to the question of whether they can indeed costlessly reveal this 
information and overcome contracting problems via indirect verification.
In this paper, we experimentally explore the performance and adoption of an SPI 
mechanism described in Maskin and Tirole (1999) that is designed to resolve the 
 hold-up problem in bilateral exchange with observable but  nonverifiable ex ante effort. 
In our experiment, a seller is selling a good to a buyer and may provide costly effort to 
increase the value of the good. Effort and the value of the good are commonly known 
to the trading parties, but they are not verifiable by a  third-party court. This implies 
that the two parties cannot write a contract that conditions payments on effort or the 
value of the good and hence, any effort made by the seller is prone to hold up.
While effort is not verifiable by a  third-party court, public announcements can be 
recorded and used in legal proceedings. Thus, the two parties can in principle write a 
contract that specifies trade prices as an increasing function of the buyer’s announce-
ment of the good’s value. If the buyer always announces the true value of the good, 
then his announcements can be used to set prices that promote efficient effort. One 
way of ensuring buyer truth-telling is to implement an arbitration mechanism that 
allows announcements to be challenged by the seller and to punish the buyer any 
time he is challenged. If the seller challenges only when the buyer has underreported 
the good’s value, then the threat of punishment will ensure truth-telling.
The crux of the implementation problem is to give the seller the incentive to chal-
lenge only those buyer announcements that are below the value of the good. A key 
property of the SPI mechanism is that it provides incentives for selfish buyers to tell 
the truth and for selfish sellers to challenge only in the case that the buyer lied. This 
is achieved by combining the seller’s challenge with an immediate fine for the buyer 
and a counter-offer that the buyer will accept only if he lied. If the buyer accepts the 
counter-offer and thus reveals that he was lying, the mechanism rewards the seller 
for appropriately challenging the buyer. If, however, the buyer rejects the challenge, 
the mechanism also fines the seller, and no trade occurs.
Since the value of the good is common knowledge between the buyer and the 
seller, the seller will only challenge if he knows the buyer will accept the count-
er-offer (i.e., fail the truth test), because otherwise the seller will be fined. The 
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buyer understands that the seller has the incentive to only challenge lies, and thus 
he will make a truthful announcement.  Truth-telling is therefore part of the unique 
 subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game, and truthful announcements can be 
used as part of a formal contract.
In our experiment, we constructed the SPI mechanism so that (i)  the sellers 
have an incentive to choose high effort levels and (ii)   truth-telling is the unique 
 subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome. Instead, we find that the mechanism does 
not induce high effort, and buyer lies are prevalent. By construction, the mechanism 
uses  off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the 
inappropriate use of arbitration. While arbitration is predicted never to occur in the 
subgame-perfect equilibrium, buyers frequently lie under the mechanism and retal-
iate against sellers who legitimately use arbitration to challenge buyers’ lies. These 
deviations from the predicted equilibrium lead to the imposition of sizable fines on 
both parties. Due to the mechanism’s negative effects on parties’ pecuniary payoffs, 
the trading parties opt out of the mechanism in the majority of the cases when given 
the chance to do so. These results are not just observed in one parametrization of the 
mechanism. In two additional treatments that implemented different cost and benefit 
parameters, frequent lies and low efficiency prevail.
Why does the mechanism perform so badly relative to the theoretical predictions? 
It is often argued that SPI mechanisms are complicated and impose strong ratio-
nality requirements in the form of, for example, backward induction or sequential 
rationality. For this reason, it is thought that SPI mechanisms are likely to fail. Our 
subjects, however, do well in terms of backward induction: sellers correctly forecast 
retaliation against the legitimate use of arbitration and, therefore, only infrequently 
invoke arbitration. Buyers forecast this reluctance and make lies that are unlikely to 
be challenged. Finally, sellers correctly forecast these lies when making their invest-
ment decisions. These behavioral patterns also prevail when we provide our subjects 
intense training opportunities, which include a direct description of the incentives 
the mechanism provides and the opportunity to play against a computer that acts in 
a  payoff-maximizing way. Thus, it is not a lack of rationality that is fundamental to 
the failure of the mechanism.
Instead, our data suggest that negative reciprocity is the primary force inhibiting 
efficiency. The intuitive reason for the important role of negative reciprocity is that 
the mechanism imposes a large fine on a lying buyer if the seller triggers arbitration. 
Buyers motivated by negative reciprocity therefore retaliate against sellers who trig-
ger arbitration which, under the rules of the mechanism, imposes large costs on the 
seller. As a consequence, sellers who anticipate buyers’ retaliation are reluctant to 
trigger arbitration, generating lying incentives for the buyers.
Many laboratory experiments have shown that a substantial share of people 
seem to be motivated by negative reciprocity (e.g., Blount 1995; Fehr, Gächter, and 
Kirchsteiger 1997; Offerman 2002; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher 2008) and field 
evidence also points toward the importance of this motive (e.g., Kube, Maréchal, 
and Puppe 2013; Cohn et al. 2014). However, theories of social preferences and 
reciprocity (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Falk and Fischbacher 2006; Dufwenberg, 
Smith, and Van Essen 2013) as well as experimental evidence (e.g., Roth et al. 
1991; Fischbacher, Fong, and Fehr 2000; Güth, Marchand, and Rulliére 1998) have 
shown that such preferences do not automatically become behaviorally relevant in 
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all settings. For example, in some competitive markets, they play little role. Thus, 
whether negative reciprocity affects behavior depends on the institutional environ-
ment. Our empirical results suggest that these preferences play a key role in the 
 Maskin-Tirole mechanism.
Because the empirical evidence strongly points toward the importance of nega-
tive reciprocity for SPI mechanisms, we apply (a slightly adapted version of) the 
Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium (SRE) concept of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 
(2004) to our context. We show that if buyers are motivated by reciprocity, they 
are willing to reject counter-offers after small lies, even if they have only weak 
preferences for reciprocity. However, the rejection of counter-offers triggers a large 
fine for the seller and, thus, constitutes an unkind act. This raises the question why 
reciprocal sellers do not retaliate against the expected rejection of counter-offers by 
challenging buyers’ lies. In other words, reciprocal sellers could, in principle, dis-
courage buyers from lying by threatening to challenge lies, even if they know that 
buyers will reject the subsequent counter-offer. In this way, seller reciprocity could 
be the remedy for the problems generated by the buyers’ negative reciprocity.
However, our theoretical analysis shows that a very large amount of seller reciproc-
ity is required to induce them to challenge buyers’ lies, while only a little bit of buyer 
reciprocity suffices to induce buyers to reject counter-offers. These asymmetric reci-
procity requirements are a result of the inherent asymmetry in the timing of the fines in 
the canonical SPI mechanism that we study. When the seller decides whether to retal-
iate against the buyer’s lie and the anticipated rejection of the counter-offer, she incurs 
a large fine in case of a challenge. She can avoid paying this fine by refraining from 
the challenge. In contrast, when the buyer decides whether to reject a counter-offer, the 
fine has already been imposed on him and thus does not count as a part of the cost of 
rejecting the offer. Retaliation by challenging a lie is thus much more expensive than 
rejecting a counter-offer, implying that much stronger reciprocity motives are required 
to challenge a lie compared to rejecting a counter-offer.
We also show theoretically that the sequential structure of fines may lead to devi-
ations from  truth-telling in any canonical SPI mechanism. In particular, we show 
that for any canonical SPI mechanism that implements, under selfish preferences, 
a pricing rule that increases with the value of the good, there exists a distribution 
of reciprocal preferences where  truth-telling is not a sequential reciprocity equilib-
rium at least one-quarter of the time. Thus, negative reciprocity has the potential to 
impact all canonical SPI mechanisms.
Based on these insights, we developed an alternative mechanism, the Retaliatory 
Seller (RS) mechanism, that reduces the strong reciprocity requirement for the 
seller to challenge buyers’ lies.2 The key idea behind the RS mechanism is that 
at the announcement stage both the buyer and the seller announce the value of 
the good. If they announce the same value, the game stops and trade occurs at 
the announced value. If they disagree, the seller is fined and given the option to 
challenge the buyer. Thus, when the seller decides whether to challenge, the fine 
2 We also considered the approach pursued by Bierbrauer and Netzer (2016) and Bierbrauer et al. (2017) who 
developed a  retaliation-robust class of mechanisms that eliminate players’ desires or abilities to act on their retalia-
tory preferences. It turns out, however, that such mechanisms are tantamount to a  fixed-price contract in the  hold-up 
setting such that they cannot solve bilateral  hold-up problems with cross investments.
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is sunk and only a moderate amount of reciprocity suffices to ensure that the seller 
will challenge a buyer’s lie even when she believes with certainty that the buyer 
will retaliate.
We show that  truth-telling is an equilibrium outcome of the RS mechanism for a 
wider range of reciprocity parameters when using the same pricing rules (the map-
ping of announcements into trade prices and counter-offers) as our original experi-
ment. We also show generally that for any SPI mechanism and RS mechanism that 
use the same pricing rules and fines, there always exists a distribution of reciprocity 
parameters where the RS mechanism has a  truth-telling equilibrium while the SPI 
mechanism does not. In this sense, the RS mechanism is more robust to negative 
reciprocity than the SPI mechanism.3
Finally, we test the new mechanism and find that the RS mechanism outper-
forms the SPI mechanism, and if we implement the same intense training protocol 
as for the SPI mechanism, it achieves truthful reports in over 90 percent of the 
cases, induces high effort in over  90 percent of the cases, and achieves very high 
levels of aggregate efficiency. However, despite these high performance scores, 
the RS mechanism does not appear to meet the participation constraint of both 
parties because it is only adopted in 20 to 60  percent of the cases. Buyers are 
particularly reluctant to opt into the mechanism. This might be due to the fact that 
in roughly 5 percent of the cases, the RS mechanism is still associated with dis-
agreements and the payment of large fines. In addition, there is a subset of “trust-
ing” sellers who initially exert high effort even in cases where the mechanism is 
dismissed. The buyers exploit these sellers, which boosts their average earning in 
the absence of the mechanism.
Taken together, our findings suggest that reciprocity and  other-regarding prefer-
ences may cripple proposed mechanisms in many settings and that  real-world mecha-
nisms need to be tailored to the underlying behavioral environment.  Subgame-perfect 
implementation mechanisms designed under the assumption that participants are 
 self-interested may perform very poorly and be abandoned by participants. Viable 
 real-world mechanisms must take into consideration the retaliatory inclinations of the 
people involved and their beliefs about other players’ retaliatory propensities.
Apart from speaking to the debate on the  microfoundation of incomplete contracts 
and the justifiability of the “observable but not verifiable information” assumption, 
our paper is also related to the theoretical literature on the role of reciprocity in 
contract design (Cabrales and Charness 2010, Englmaier and Leider 2012, Netzer 
and Volk 2014), mechanism design (Bierbrauer and Netzer 2016, Bartling and 
Netzer 2016, Bierbrauer et al. 2017), and implementation (de Clippel, Eliaz, and 
Knight 2014), as well as to the experimental literature that examines how negative 
reciprocity affects behavior in settings with a hold-up problem (e.g., Dufwenberg, 
Smith, and Van Essen 2013). The interesting study by de Clippel, Eliaz, and Knight 
(2014), in particular, corroborates the conclusion that reciprocity preferences need 
to be taken into account in mechanism design. They examine a  short-listing mech-
anism used to select arbitrators and show that the underperformance of this mecha-
nism is consistent with  intentions-based reciprocity. We contribute to the literature by 
3 We also show that the converse of this statement is not true: there are no distributions of reciprocity parameters 
where  truth-telling is an equilibrium of the SPI mechanism but not an equilibrium in the RS mechanism.
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showing that the functioning of an important class of SPI mechanisms, ones that have 
played a prominent role in the debate on the microfoundation of incomplete contracts, 
is undermined by retaliatory behaviors. We show that a model of reciprocity explains 
the major regularities of the SPI mechanism and we use the model to develop an alter-
native mechanism that is predicted to perform well under realistic assumption on the 
distribution of reciprocity preferences. The new mechanism in fact outperforms the 
original SPI mechanism and achieves very high levels of  truth-telling and efficiency 
when intense training opportunities prevail.
Our paper also contributes more generally to the experimental literature on imple-
mentation.4 Sefton and Yavaş (1996) study  extensive-form  Abreu-Matsushima 
mechanisms that vary in the number of stages and find that  incentive-compatible 
mechanisms with 8 and 12 stages perform worse than a mechanism with 4 stages 
that is not incentive compatible. Katok, Sefton, and Yava¸s (2002) study both 
simultaneous and sequential versions of the  Abreu-Matsushima mechanism and 
conclude that individuals use only a limited number of iterations of dominance and 
steps of backward induction. Based on these papers, we restricted our attention 
to mechanisms that required only two levels of backward induction. Our paper is 
also related to the recent experimental work of Aghion et al. (2018), which tests 
the theoretical predictions of Aghion et al. (2012) in an environment where the 
impact of reciprocity is predicted to be small. The theory paper shows that the 
absence of common knowledge about the state of nature limits the performance of 
SPI mechanisms, and the experimental paper confirms this prediction.5
I.  Subgame-Perfect Implementation
We begin with a description of a simplified version of the Maskin and Tirole 
argument and highlight how a  subgame-perfect implementation mechanism can 
potentially solve the classic  hold-up problem when effort is  noncontractible. A 
seller and buyer bargain over the production and exchange of a good. The seller can 
choose an effort level  e that determines the value of a good that he can costlessly 
produce and sell to the buyer. Effort costs  e to the seller and determines a distri-
bution over the buyer’s valuation  v ∈  , where   is a finite set of possible buyer 
valuations. Let  e FB be the  first-best effort level, which maximizes  E[v|e] − e . Given 
the buyer’s valuation  v and the seller’s effort  e , if trade occurs at price  p , the seller 
receives a payoff of  p − e , and the buyer receives a payoff of  v − p .
4 An extensive experimental literature also exists looking at efficiency of implementation mechanisms in the 
public goods provision problem. Chen and Plott (1996), Chen and Tang (1998), and Healy (2006) study learning 
dynamics in public good provision mechanisms. Andreoni and Varian (1999) and Falkinger et al. (2000) study 
 two-stage compensation mechanisms that build on work from  Moore-Repullo (1988), while Harstad and Marrese 
(1981, 1982); Attiyeh, Franciosi, and Isaac (2000); Arifovic and Ledyard (2004); and Bracht, Figuières, and Ratto 
(2008) study the voluntary contribution game, Groves–Ledyard, and Falkinger mechanisms, respectively. Masuda, 
Okano, and Saijo (2014) study approval mechanisms and emphasize the need for implementation mechanisms to be 
robust to multiple reasoning processes and behavioral assumptions. Cabrales, Charness, and Corchón (2003) study 
Nash implementation in an abstract setting with  three-player groups and find that a preference for honesty may play 
a role. Ponti et al. (2003) study a  two-stage mechanism that theoretically solves King Solomon’s Dilemma, but this 
mechanism does not solve the  hold-up problem studied here. In addition, none of the  papers mentioned above give 
subjects the opportunity to voluntarily select into the mechanism.
5 Chen et al. (2018) explore how mechanisms can be made robust to small perturbations in common knowledge 
when initial rationalizability is used as a solution concept and lotteries are allowed.
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The good’s value to the buyer is observable to both parties but  nonverifiable by a 
court. To highlight the  hold-up problem, assume that after the seller’s effort choice 
has been sunk, the buyer makes a  take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller, resulting in 
a trade price of  p = 0 . Since the trade price does not depend on the seller’s effort 
choice, the seller has no incentives to choose a costly effort level even if doing 
so would be socially efficient. Consequently, both parties would prefer a pricing 
rule,  p(v) , that is more sensitive to the actual value of the good, as such a pricing 
rule would provide incentives for the seller to choose high effort. Formal contracts 
written directly on this value cannot be used because the value is  nonverifiable. 
However, Maskin and Tirole (1999) argue that a contract in which the trade price 
depends on a public message can achieve the  first-best outcome if it is augmented 
with a verification system based on Moore and Repullo (1988). In particular, con-
sider the following class of  subgame-perfect-implementation (SPI) mechanisms 
that is designed to implement a  non-decreasing pricing rule  p(v) :
 (i) The buyer and seller sign a contract with a third party, whom we will call the 
arbitrator. The contract specifies (a) an  initial-price schedule  p( v ˆ) at which 
trade may occur, given an announcement  v ˆ that the buyer makes in stage (iii), 
and (b) a  counter-offer schedule  p ˆ ( v ˆ) and fines  F B and  F S , which may jointly 
be used to mediate disagreement and will be discussed below. Note that both 
p( ⋅ ) and  p ˆ ( ⋅ ) are based only on the buyer’s announcement, which can be 
made publicly observable (and therefore verifiable). The initial price sched-
ule  p ( ⋅ ) corresponds to the desired pricing rule if  v ˆ = v for all  v .
 (ii) The seller chooses effort  e , which determines a distribution over the buyer’s 
valuations  v ∈  . The realized value  v is commonly observed by both the 
buyer and seller.
 (iii) The buyer announces  v ˆ ∈  . The announcement  v ˆ is observable to the seller 
and the arbitrator.
 (iv) The seller may challenge the announcement. If he does not, trade occurs at 
price  p( v ˆ) , and the game ends. If he does, the buyer pays a fine  F B to the arbi-
trator, and play proceeds.
 (v) The buyer is given a counter-offer  p ˆ ( v ˆ) . If the buyer accepts the counter-offer 
and buys, he pays  p ˆ ( v ˆ) and receives the good, and the seller is paid  F S ≤  F B 
by the arbitrator.
 (vi) If the buyer rejects the counter-offer, the seller gives the good to the arbitra-
tor, and it is destroyed. Additionally, the seller must also pay a fine  F S to the 
arbitrator.
An SPI mechanism, which we will denote by  γ SPI , is therefore a collection 
 ( p ˆ ( ⋅ ),  F B ,  F S ) consisting of a  counter-offer schedule, a buyer fine, and a seller 
fine, that is designed to implement pricing rule  p( ⋅ ) . The logic of this mechanism 
is that the  counter-offer schedule and fines are constructed so that if the buyer 
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and seller are commonly known to be sequentially rational, the buyer never 
has an incentive to announce a  v ˆ ≠ v . We will say that SPI mechanism  γ SPI 
 subgame-perfect- equilibrium (SPE)-implements pricing rule  p(v) if under 
every  subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game, trade occurs at price  p(v) if  v 
is the buyer’s valuation. We will also say that SPI mechanism  γ SPI achieves effi-
ciency if under every  subgame-perfect equilibrium, the seller chooses  e FB , and 
trade always occurs.
In the online Appendix, we show that the following three conditions are sufficient 
to ensure that  γ SPI  SPE-implements  p( ⋅ ) :
 (a)  Counter-Offer Condition: The buyer prefers to accept any counter-offer 
 p ˆ ( v ˆ) for which he has announced  v ˆ < v and reject any counter-offer for 
which he has announced  v ˆ ≥ v .
 (b)  Appropriate-Challenge Condition: The seller prefers to challenge 
announcements  v ˆ < v and not challenge announcements  v ˆ ≥ v .
 (c)  Truth-Telling Condition: The buyer prefers to announce  v ˆ = v rather than 
v ˆ ≠ v .
We also show that for any increasing and  nonnegative pricing rule  p( ⋅ ) , there always 
exists a SPI mechanism  γ SPI that  SPE-implements  p ( ⋅ ) . This result implies that for 
any increasing and  nonnegative pricing rule that motivates the seller to choose an 
optimal effort level, we can design an SPI mechanism that implements this rule, that 
is, the parties can trade as if contracts were complete.
II. Experimental Design: The SPI Treatment
In this section, we describe the SPI mechanism we implement experimentally in 
the SPI Treatment and highlight the predicted patterns of play when buyers and 
sellers have selfish preferences. The SPI treatment uses the SPI mechanism of the 
class described in Section I and is divided into two phases that vary only in the rules 
governing the mechanism’s adoption.
Phase 1: Phase 1 of the experiment consists of 10 periods. In each period, a seller 
is  perfect-stranger matched with a buyer and the two parties play the following 
 four-stage game:
 (i) Effort Stage: In the effort stage the seller chooses either high or low effort. 
Low effort costs 30 and generates a good the buyer values at 120. High effort 
costs 120 and generates a good the buyer values at 260.
 (ii) The Announcement Stage: The buyer is informed about the value of the 
good. The buyer then announces  v ˆ ∈  V ˆ = {100, 120, …, 260, 280, 300} . 
Note that  V ˆ includes (a )  the true value for each potential effort choice, 
(b ) small lies below each true value, and (c ) generous offers above each true 
value. We discuss this choice of announcement space in Section IIA.
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 (iii) The Arbitration Stage: The seller is informed about the buyer’s announce-
ment and reminded of the true value. The seller then has the option to “call 
the arbitrator” or to “not call the arbitrator.” We will often refer to the act of 
“calling the arbitrator” as a challenge.
(a)  If the seller chooses to call the arbitrator, the buyer is charged an arbitra-
tion fee of  F B = 250 and enters the Arbitration Response Stage.
(b)  If the seller chooses to not call the arbitrator, the two parties trade at
  p ( v ˆ) = 70 + 0.75 ( v ˆ − 100) .
Note that this price is based on the buyer’s original announcement. This 
price function is shown in column 2 of Table 1.
 (iv) The Arbitration Response Stage: If the buyer enters the arbitration stage, 
he is given a counter-offer of  p ˆ ( v ˆ) =  v ˆ + 5. This price is again based on the 
buyer’s announcement.
(a)  If the buyer accepts the counter-offer, the seller is given an arbitration 
reward of  F S = 250 and trade occurs at  p ˆ ( v ˆ) .
(b)  Otherwise trade does not occur and the seller is also fined  F S = 250 . 
Note that the seller’s initial production costs are sunk in the effort stage 
and thus the seller’s losses are equal to  − 280 if the seller chose low effort 
and  − 370 if the seller chose high effort.
Phase 2: In periods 11–20, the buyer and seller are again  perfect-stranger matched 
at the start of each period. The buyer and seller are then given the choice to opt in 
or opt out of the mechanism prior to the seller’s effort choice. We framed opting out 
of the mechanism as “dismissing the arbitrator” so that opting in is the status quo. 
If the buyer and seller opt in, they are informed that the arbitrator is available, and 
play continues as in the first ten periods. If either party opts out, the game is identical 
to the game in the first phase, except that the seller may not challenge the buyer’s 
announcement, and trade must occur at price  p( v ˆ) . Both parties are informed about 
whether the arbitrator is available but are not informed about the dismissal deci-
sion of the other party. This implies that if a subject opts out, he cannot determine 
whether his counterparty opted in or out.
As seen in Table 1, the mechanism  γ SPI satisfies the  Counter-Offer, 
 Appropriate-Challenge, and  Truth-Telling Conditions described in Section  I, 
and there is a unique  subgame-perfect equilibrium, which involves the following 
predictions.
SPI HYPOTHESIS 1: Along the equilibrium path, the seller chooses high effort, 
the buyer makes a truthful announcement, and the seller does not challenge. If the 
seller challenges an announcement of  v ˆ, the buyer accepts the counter-offer if and 
only if  v ˆ < v .
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We refer to the  equilibrium-path behavior described in SPI Hypothesis 1 as effi-
cient  truth-telling behavior and the resulting outcome as the efficient outcome. 
Note that under the efficient outcome, the buyer earns 70 and the seller earns 70. 
If either party opts out of the mechanism in the second phase, the arbitrator is not 
available, and the buyer will make the lowest possible announcement,  v ˆ = 100 , 
regardless of the true value. The seller has no incentive to choose high effort in 
this case and will therefore choose low effort. Consequently, the SPNE payoffs if 
either party opts out are  50 for the buyer and  40 for the seller. As both parties have 
higher pecuniary payoffs with the mechanism than without it, we have the following 
prediction:
SPI HYPOTHESIS 2: The buyer and seller opt into the mechanism in periods 11–20.
A. Discussion of Design Features
As the goal of our experiment is to assess the plausibility of using SPI mecha-
nisms in  real-world contracting environments, we make a number of design choices 
that can be divided into roughly two categories: features that make the mechanism 
easier to implement experimentally and features that broaden the applicability of the 
mechanism to richer settings.
To work toward this first objective, we focus on a subset of SPI mechanisms in 
which the  counter-offer schedule is independent of the good’s actual value. In more 
general environments, following the buyer’s announcement, the seller chooses a 
particular counter-offer that depends on the buyer’s announcement as well as the 
good’s actual value. For example, if the good is worth  v , and the buyer announces 
any value other than  v , the seller offers to sell the good to the buyer at a price strictly 
between the buyer’s announcement and  v . Additionally, to further reduce the cogni-
tive complexity of the experiment, we assume there are only two effort choices and 
two possible values for the good.
Table 1—Correspondence between Announcement, Prices, and Outcomes in SPI Treatment
Low effort High effort
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 100  70  105  50  40  15  190  − 50 155
 120  85  125 35 55  − 5  175  − 35 135
 140  100  145  20  70  − 25  160  − 20 115
 160  115  165  5  85  − 45  145  − 5 95
 180  130  185  − 10  100  − 65  130  10 75
 200  145  205  − 25  115  − 85  115  25 55
 220  160  225  − 40  130  − 105  100  40 35
 240  175  245  − 55  145  − 125  85  55 15
 260  190  265  − 70  160  − 145 70 70  − 5 
 280  205  285  − 85  175  − 165  55  85  − 20 
 300  220  305  − 100  190  − 185  40  100  − 45 
Notes: Bolded values in the Buyer’s net profit of accepting counter-offer column show announcements for which a 
selfish buyer would accept the counter-offer if challenged. A selfish buyer will make the lowest possible announce-
ment that is not challenged. This will be an announcement of  260 after high effort and  120 after low effort. As these 
are the true values, this mechanism induces truth-telling.
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Our choice of  initial-price and  counter-offer schedules is intended to encourage 
 truth-telling behavior, under which both players receive an equal payoff of 70.6 Our 
expectation is that preferences for equity, for which there is substantial evidence 
in laboratory experiments, makes such behavior more salient. We also transferred 
the entire fine  F B to the seller in the case of a successful challenge to maximize the 
seller’s expected value to challenging.
Finally, to ensure that the buyer has strict incentives to adopt the mechanism in 
the second phase, we give the buyer some of the surplus generated from efficient 
effort. Absent the mechanism, under the unique SPNE, the seller chooses  e = 30 , 
and the buyer announces  v ˆ = 100 , yielding payoffs of  50 to the buyer and  40 to 
the seller. If the mechanism induces efficient  truth-telling behavior, the buyer’s gain 
from adopting it is  20 , and the seller’s gain is  30 .
Moore and Repullo show that in a broad class of environments, any social choice 
function can be implemented using a  three-stage mechanism. In simpler environ-
ments, some social choice functions can be implemented using  two-stage mecha-
nisms. For example, in our environment, the efficient outcome can be implemented 
using a  two-stage “option contract” (see, for example, Nöldeke and Schmidt 1995). 
We deliberately explore the performance of a  three-stage mechanism in our simple 
environment with  one-sided  hold-up and no uncertainty because if such mecha-
nisms fail to work well in a simple environment, they are even more likely to fail in 
the more complex environments that necessitate their use.7
In the experiment, we restricted the set of possible values of the good to be a 
strict subset of the announcement space. This restriction simplifies the experiment 
substantially relative to an experiment with 11 possible values. We view this feature 
of the experiment as an approximation of a more realistic environment in which no 
potential values can be completely ruled out in advance. For example, it approx-
imates an environment in which the probability of the value being 120 after low 
effort and 260 after high effort is equal to  1 − ϵ and the probability of one of the 
other values is  ϵ . It also approximates an environment in which the announcement 
space is the set of potential values at the time of signing the initial contract and that 
at some later date some of the values are no longer possible. Such contracts are in 
the spirit of Maskin and Tirole (1999), which discusses at length the possibility of 
using SPI mechanism to write contracts that are flexible and that can adapt when 
new physical contingencies arise that cannot be described ex ante.
Finally, a larger fine slackens the  Appropriate-Challenge and  Truth-Telling 
Conditions, and in our SPI Treatment both are satisfied for any fines  F B > 85 
and  F S > 85 . According to SPI Hypothesis 1, since a larger fine would also sat-
isfy these conditions, our choice of  F B =  F S = 250 should not affect the perfor-
mance of the mechanism. We deliberately chose a high fine, because one of the key 
6 The experimental literature on implementation (e.g., Cabrales, Charness, and Corchón 2003; Aghion et al. 
2018) and contract theory (e.g.,  Sanchez-Pages and Vorsatz 2007, Ederer and Fehr 2007) suggest that some individ-
uals have a preference for honesty. In our SPI mechanism, such preferences should reinforce the SPNE since buyers 
are expected to report truthfully along the equilibrium path.
7 Hoppe and Schmitz (2011) experimentally study simple  single-price option contracts in a  one-sided  hold-up 
environment and find promising efficiency improvements even when renegotiation is allowed. Unfortunately, the 
mechanisms that they consider cannot implement the  first-best solution in the environment most commonly used in 
the incomplete contracts literature where the buyer’s investment reduces the seller’s cost and the seller’s investment 
increases the buyer’s value.
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steps in the constructive proofs of SPI mechanisms in the literature is showing that 
all  incentive-compatibility constraints can be satisfied if arbitrarily large fines are 
allowed.
B. Experimental Protocol
The experiments were run in the Experimental Economics Laboratory at the 
University of Melbourne between May and September 2009 and between November 
2017 and February 2018. Experiments were conducted using  z-Tree (Fischbacher 
2007). All 520 subjects participating in the SPI Treatment and  follow-up treatments 
(described in Sections IV and V) were undergraduate students at the university and 
were randomly invited from a pool of more than 5,000 volunteers using ORSEE 
(Greiner 2015).8 Session sizes varied from 20 to 26. We ran two additional control 
sessions without the mechanism in 2015 (N = 38). In these control experiments, 
subjects played 20 periods of our SPI Treatment without the possibility for buyer 
announcements to be challenged. We use these sessions to estimate average effi-
ciency in the absence of the mechanism.
In sessions run in 2009, subjects participated in a Personal Norms of Reciprocity 
(PNR) survey developed by Perugini et al. (2003). This survey consisted of 27 ques-
tions related to a subject’s inclination to punish hostile or reward kind acts. Using 
 principal-components analysis, these questions were combined into orthogonal 
measures of positive and negative reciprocity for each subject. Subjects earned $10 
for the survey and a $10  show-up fee, which were used to insulate individuals from 
bankruptcy. The survey was conducted two weeks prior to the experiment at the 
point of sign up in order to mitigate demand effects that might occur from running 
the SPI Treatment and survey during the same session.
Upon arrival to the laboratory, subjects began by playing a lottery game to elicit 
aversion to gambles that involve the risk of losses. Each subject was presented with 
the opportunity to participate in six different lotteries, each having the following form:
Win $12 with probability  1/2 , lose  X with probability  1/2 . If subjects 
reject the lottery, they receive $0.
The six lotteries varied in the amount  X that could be lost, where  X ∈ 
{4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14} . One of the six gambles was randomly selected at the end of the 
experiment and paid.9 These lotteries enable us to construct a measure of heteroge-
neity in the willingness to accept actuarially fair gambles. Discussion of the lottery 
task can be found in Fehr and Goette (2007).
Following the lottery task, subjects were assigned the role of a buyer or a seller, 
which was fixed for the duration of the experiment. Subjects were then asked to 
read the instructions and answer a series of practice questions that were checked by 
the experimenter. These instructions explained the first phase of the experiment (in 
8 All data and code for this paper are available in Fehr, Powell, and Wilkening (2021).
9 The lottery treatment was run prior to the experiment to prevent strategic choices by subjects with large losses 
from the main experiment who might have negative earnings under a subset of the lotteries. The lottery treatment 
was resolved after the experiment to prevent endowment effects from impacting decisions made in the experiment.
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which the arbitrator is exogenously available) as well as the rules regarding random 
matching and payment. The instructions were accompanied by a detailed payment 
chart showing the price and counter-offer for each announcement as well as the 
payment to the buyer and the seller for each potential outcome of the game. The 
instructions explicitly explained how to read this chart, and subjects were required 
to work through examples of play with announcements of 180 and 260 to ensure that 
everyone understood the pecuniary incentives of buyers and sellers after a truthful 
announcement and a lie. All subjects were required to answer all questions correctly 
before continuing.
Once the answers of all subjects were checked, the experimenter read aloud a 
summary of the instructions. The purpose of the summary was to ensure that the 
main features of the experiment were common knowledge amongst the participants. 
The oral instructions also explained that there would be a second phase of the exper-
iment and that instructions would be handed out for this phase after the first phase 
was complete. Subjects were explicitly informed that the second phase would be 
similar to the first and that their actions in the first phase would have no influence on 
the rules and potential earnings of the second phase.
To better understand the rationale for subjects’ choices, we also elicited buyers’ 
and sellers’ beliefs about the other parties’ likely actions. For the buyers, we elicited 
the likelihood that the seller would challenge for each of the possible announce-
ments given the effort level actually chosen by the seller. These likelihoods were 
elicited using a  4-point Likert scale (Never/Unlikely/Likely/Always) in each 
period following the buyer’s announcement. Similarly, we asked each seller the like-
lihood that their challenge would be rejected if they were to challenge the buyer’s 
announcement. This belief was elicited directly after the decision to challenge or not 
challenge the buyer’s announcement.
The choice of unpaid beliefs for our main experiment were based on three con-
siderations. First, we wanted to have a full set of belief information including beliefs 
about counterfactual actions. In order to elicit these beliefs in an  incentive-compatible 
way, we would have had to use the strategy method for eliciting the seller’s chal-
lenges and the buyer’s acceptance or rejection decision. Given that the solution 
concept of subgame perfection is such an important part of the implementation 
mechanism, we were averse to using the strategy method at interior nodes. Second, 
we felt explaining an additional belief elicitation mechanism would take attention 
away from the main experiment. Third, in games where both beliefs and action are 
compensated, risk averse individuals may find it optimal to hedge risk by stating 
beliefs which differ from their true estimates.10
The large fine size in the SPI Treatment opened up the possibility that subjects 
could go bankrupt. As such, the protocol for bankruptcy was made explicit to all 
subjects. Subjects began the experiment with a $10  show-up fee and the $10 from 
the online survey. If a subject accumulated $10 in losses, their money from the 
online survey payment was liquidated, and they received a warning. If they lost all 
$20 of their initial endowment, they were removed from the experiment. There were 
no bankruptcies in the SPI treatment and a total of five bankruptcies in all other 
10 See Blanco et al. (2010) for a discussion of hedging.
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treatments. All these subjects were buyers. In these cases, the lab manager took over 
the terminal and played the SPNE equilibrium path actions. All tests reported in the 
paper are robust to dropping sessions where there was a bankruptcy.
III. Experimental Results of the SPI Treatment
We describe the results of the SPI Treatment in this section. For purposes of cat-
egorizing data, we define  v ˆ < v(e) as a lie,  v(e) − 60 ≤  v ˆ < v(e) as a small lie, 
v ˆ = v(e) as a truthful announcement, and  v ˆ > v(e) as a generous announce-
ment. We define an appropriate challenge as a challenge of a lie and an inap-
propriate challenge as a challenge of a truthful announcement or a generous 
announcement. Note that the terms lying, challenge, and truthful announcement are 
never used in the experiment.
A. Behavior under the Mechanism
Under SPI  Hypothesis 1, our experimental design generates sharp predictions 
about the course of play: the seller will always choose high effort, the buyer will 
always announce the actual value of the good, the seller will challenge if and only 
if doing so is appropriate, and the buyer will accept counter-offers if and only if 
they result from an appropriate challenge. The data from periods 1–10 of our SPI 
Treatment provide strikingly little support for SPI Hypothesis 1.
Result 1: (a) In a majority of cases buyers make small lies, (b) the large majority 
of these lies are not challenged by the sellers, (c) the buyers reject counter-offers 
in most cases, and (d), the mechanism does not induce high effort in many cases. 
On average, (e) the parties have higher pecuniary payoffs without the mechanism. 
Figure 1 displays the patterns of play we observed in the first ten periods of the 
experiment. The left column examines play following low effort  (N = 200) , and 
the right column examines play following high effort  (N = 260) . Panel A summa-
rizes the buyers’ announcement decisions, panel B summarizes the sellers’ chal-
lenge decisions for different announcements, and panel C summarizes the buyers’ 
decisions to accept or reject counter-offers. An observation is a  dyad-period.
Panel A shows that buyers lied in the majority of observations: following high 
(low) effort, only 37 percent (31 percent) of buyers announce the true value of the 
good, while 54 percent (61 percent) make small lies. Downward lies are increas-
ingly less frequent the larger they are.
Panel B shows the proportion of sellers who challenge each announcement  v ˆ. SPI 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that sellers challenge 100 percent of the time after a lie and 
never challenge after a truthful or generous announcement. In the data, the challenge 
probability for small lies is less than 30 percent.
Further, SPI Hypothesis 1 predicts that buyers will accept all counter-offers fol-
lowing appropriate challenges and reject all counter-offers following inappropriate 
challenges. Panel C shows that in the case of low effort, 21 out of 27 appropriate 
challenges are rejected; in the case of high effort, 43 out of 52 appropriate chal-
lenges are rejected.
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Finally, average surplus in periods  1–10 of the experiment for a buyer and seller 
pair was only 7.2. To put this number into perspective, average total surplus in peri-
ods   1–10 of our control treatment without the mechanism was 97.1, total surplus 
in the unique SPNE when the mechanism is unavailable is 90, and the total surplus 
under the efficient outcome is 140. The introduction of the mechanism thus leads to 
a 93 percent reduction in efficiency relative to the control treatment. This difference 
is significant (  p -value  < 0.01 ) in a comparison of means.11 Normalizing the actual 
gain generated by the mechanism by the predicted theoretical gain of the mechanism, 
the realized gain from the mechanism is  (7.2 − 90)/(140 − 90) = − 166 percent .
While the results in Figure 1 are presented as the aggregate of all 10 periods, 
there is very little change in the pattern of play when looked at on a period by period 
basis. In online Appendix Section C1, we show how effort, announcements, and 
11 All statistical tests in the paper are clustered at the individual level unless otherwise specified.
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challenges of small lies evolve over the first ten periods. As seen there, the pro-
portion of sellers exerting high effort is relatively stable at roughly 55 percent, the 
proportion of small lies is stable at roughly 55 percent, and the likelihood of a seller 
challenging a small lie is decreasing over time. This implies that the mechanism is 
actually moving away from the  truth-telling equilibrium since sellers are becoming 
more reluctant to challenge over time.
B. The Role of Beliefs
In online Appendix Section B1, we explore the role of subject’s beliefs in shaping 
his or her decision under the mechanism. As shown there, the majority of buyers 
correctly believe that small lies are unlikely to be challenged or that challenges of 
small lies will never occur. Similarly, the majority of sellers correctly believe that a 
challenge of a small lie is unlikely to be accepted or will never be accepted.
Subjects also respond to their beliefs in a consistent manner. Buyers who believe 
that a small lie is unlikely to be challenged or believe that a small lie will never 
be challenged are more likely to make a small lie than buyers with other beliefs. 
Likewise, sellers who believe that a challenge is unlikely to be accepted or will 
never be accepted are less likely to challenge than sellers with other beliefs.
The belief data suggest that individuals are correctly predicting deviations from 
the SPI predictions in later stages of the game and are responding to these beliefs in 
a consistent manner. Persistent deviations from the SPI hypothesis and the fact that 
these deviations were expected by the players suggests that the model on which our 
predictions are based may be missing an important force which exerts a systematic 
influence on beliefs and behavior. We return to this issue after reporting the results 
from the second phase of the experiment.
C. Selection of the Mechanism
We now examine data from the second phase of the experiment, where subjects 
were given the option to opt out of the mechanism. SPI Hypothesis 2 predicts all 
buyers and sellers would opt into the mechanism, since absent the mechanism, sell-
ers would always choose low effort. The results are largely inconsistent with this 
hypothesis.
Result 2: A majority of dyads opt out of the mechanism. Although the proportion 
of sellers who choose high effort is greater when the mechanism exists, both buyers 
and sellers have higher pecuniary payoffs when the mechanism is unavailable than 
when it is available.
Panel A of Figure 2 shows the  opt-out behavior for buyers and sellers over the 
last 10 periods of the experiment. On average, 65 percent of groups have at least one 
subject choosing to opt out of the mechanism. While this  opt-out rate is decreasing 
over periods  11–15, the  opt-out rate continues to be high, with at least 50 percent of 
groups opting out of the mechanism in every period. Buyers are much more likely 
to opt out of the mechanism (as they did in 58 percent of the cases) than sellers are. 
The latter opt out of the mechanism in only 17 percent of the cases.
1071FEHR ET AL.: BEHAVIORAL CONSTRAINTS ON IMPLEMENTATIONVOL. 111 NO. 4
In the unique SPNE of the game without the mechanism available, the  hold-up 
problem is predicted to be unresolved: sellers are predicted to choose low effort and 
buyers are predicted to make the smallest possible announcement. As can be seen 
on the right-hand side of panel B, these predictions hold true. When either party opts 
out of the mechanism, 273 out of 298 sellers exert low effort. In 262 of these cases, 
buyers announces  v ˆ = 100 . Of the 25 observations where the seller put in high 
effort, the buyer was truthful in only 3 cases, made a small lie in 7 cases, and made 
the maximal lie of  v ˆ = 100 in 15.
For those periods in which both subjects opted in, we conjectured that the mech-
anism would perform better than it did in the first phase of the experiment, since 
opting into the mechanism ought to serve as a positive signal to the other subject 
in the dyad. From the perspective of effort, this conjecture appears to hold;  114 out 
Figure 2. Behavior in Last 10 Periods (Second Phase) of SPI Treatment
Panel A. Proportion of buyers and sellers opting out of mechanism each period
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of  162 sellers ( 70  percent) who had access to the mechanism exerted high effort 
in periods   11–20 whereas high effort was observed in only 260 out of 460 cases 
(57 percent) in the first 10 periods. This difference is significant (  p -value  < 0.01 ) 
in a probit regression.
However, when the mechanism is kept, buyers still make small lies in 32 out of 
48 cases (66 percent) after low effort and in 66 out of 114 cases (57 percent) after 
high effort. These lying rates are similar to the first 10 periods where the rate of 
small lies was 61 percent after low effort and 54 percent after high effort. The rate 
of small lies in the first 10 periods is not significantly different in either case using 
a probit regression ( low-effort case:  p -value = 0.52;  high-effort case:  p -value 
= 0.59). Across both effort levels, small lies were challenged in only 13 out of 98 
cases (13 percent), a rate that is not significantly different to the challenge rate in 
periods  8–10 (probit regression:  p -value = 0.72).
Empirically, both buyers and sellers earned lower average payoffs in periods in 
which both subjects opted in than in those in which at least one subject opted out: for 
observations in which the mechanism was available, average total surplus was  55.3 
( 35.7 for buyers and  19.6 for sellers), while for  dyad-periods in which the mecha-
nism was unavailable, average total surplus was  94.2 ( 57.4 for buyers and  36.8 for 
sellers). The average efficiency in periods   11–20 of the control treatment (where 
the mechanism was never available) was  93.4 , which is not significantly differ-
ent from the average efficiency experienced by dyads who dismiss the mechanism 
( p -value = 0.48) in a comparison of means. However, it is significantly greater 
than it is for dyads who keep the mechanism ( p -value = 0.03).
Given that both buyers and sellers are worse off with the mechanism, an imme-
diate question arises as to why buyers opt out of the mechanism with greater fre-
quency. One likely answer is that the sellers can always avoid potential states of 
disagreement by exerting low effort and never challenging the buyer. Thus, a seller 
can always guarantee a payment at least as high as the SPNE of the game without 
the mechanism with 100 percent certainty.
Buyers by contrast must contend with the potential that they will be challenged. 
Without the mechanism, buyers can guarantee themselves a payoff of 50 by making 
the lowest possible announcement. With the mechanism, the buyer profit is influ-
enced by (i) the probability that the seller exerts high effort and (ii) the probability 
that the seller will challenge a truthful announcement or a small lie. As both these 
actions are dependent on the actions of the other player, the mechanism exposes the 
buyer to uncertainty that he cannot avoid through his choices.12
12 In a previous version of this paper we also reported the results of additional SPI treatments that explored 
different cost and benefit parameters. In the  High-Benefits Treatment we changed the pricing rule such that the 
buyers had a stronger incentive to tell the truth. In the Low Fine Treatment we reduced the fines but still ensured 
that all incentive compatibility conditions were met. We hypothesized that a lower fine may reduce the perceived 
unkindness of a challenge and may thus reduce the buyer’s rejection of counter-offers, which may then lead to an 
increased willingness to challenge among the sellers. Both treatments produced, however, no overall increase in 
the performance of the SPI mechanism. The results on these mechanisms are described in more detail in online 
Appendix Sections B2–B4.
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IV. Discussion of  SPI-Treatment Results
The data soundly reject SPI Hypotheses 1 and 2. However, the mechanism fails at 
all behavioral stages in a way that is “internally consistent.” If buyers reject count-
er-offers following appropriate challenges of small lies, then sellers have a good 
reason to shy away from challenging, because it is very costly for them. Yet, if sell-
ers do not appropriately challenge small lies, then buyers have pecuniary incentives 
to under-report the value of the good. Indeed, the beliefs data support the rationale 
above for the failure of the mechanism. Sellers who believe that counter-offers fol-
lowing appropriate challenges of small lies will be rejected are significantly less 
likely to make such challenges. Buyers who believe that they will not be challenged 
for small lies are considerably more likely to make small lies.
Sellers are also right to believe that buyers will reject counter-offers following 
appropriate challenges of small lies. Although many sellers do not challenge such 
lies, some do. In these cases, the counter-offer is almost always rejected, both parties 
incur large fines, and no trade takes place. Therefore, the overall pecuniary payoffs 
generated by the mechanism are negative. On average, parties receive higher pecu-
niary payoffs trading low quality goods without the mechanism than they receive 
trading with the mechanism, which explains the observation that the players often 
do not adopt the mechanism when given the choice.
No matter what their beliefs are, it is payoff maximizing for buyers to accept 
counter-offers in subgames following appropriate challenges of small lies. If buy-
ers acted in their pecuniary interests, they would not reject such counter-offers 
and sellers would not need to fear the high costs of unsuccessful challenges. The 
mechanism, therefore, would not unravel. Our results indicate that the key to under-
standing the failure of the mechanism is to understand buyers’ willingness to reject 
counter-offers following appropriate challenges of small lies.
A. Do Mistakes Explain the Failure of the SPI Mechanism?
In online Appendix Section B5, we explore whether errors can explain buyer rejec-
tion using an Agent Quantal Response Equilibrium (AQRE), which allows subjects 
to make errors in choosing which pure action to play and that they are more likely to 
choose pure actions that involve higher expected payoffs. We show there that while 
the AQRE can match portions of the pattern of play observed, it cannot match the 
magnitude of rejections. In any QRE model with symmetric noise, a choice that has 
higher expected utility must be chosen with a higher frequency than one with a lower 
expected utility. Since accepting an appropriate challenge generates higher returns 
by construction, the maximum rejection rate that can be predicted is 1/2. Given that 
95.5 percent of appropriate challenges were rejected after high effort and a small lie, 
AQRE on its own has a hard time fully rationalizing the data.13
We also conducted a further treatment that introduced an intense training proto-
col for the purpose of minimizing subjects’ mistakes and maximizing their under-
standing of the logic behind the mechanism. In this SPI with Intense Training 
13  Level-k and other cognitive hierarchy models have a similarly difficult time fitting the extent of rejection by 
buyers since only  type-0 individuals will reject an appropriate challenge.
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Treatment, we (i)  explicitly explained in the written instructions the pecuniary 
incentives of subjects’ counterparties in the trade and (ii)  had parties play three 
unpaid periods and three paid periods against a computerized opponent that was 
programmed to play the SPNE actions as if they had selfish preferences.
The detailed results of the intense training treatments are described in online 
Appendix Section B5. Although the intense training protocol caused an improvement 
in the functioning of the SPI mechanism, sellers choose high effort levels more often 
and challenged small lies after high effort more frequently, the qualitative results still 
resemble those previously reported in Section III. In 29 percent of the cases, the buy-
ers under-report the true value of the good. The sellers refrain from challenging small 
lies in 48 percent of the cases and buyers reject challenges in 58 percent of the cases. 
Because the mechanism still generates a substantial number of disagreements, the 
parties are worse off under the mechanism compared to a control treatment without 
the mechanism. As a consequence, the mechanism was not adopted in the majority of 
the cases in Phase 2 (i.e., periods 11–20) of the experiment.
B. The Role of Retaliatory Preferences in the SPI Mechanism
Having ruled out mistakes as the primary explanation for rejections of count-
er-offers, we now consider whether a preference for retaliation can rationalize the 
observed behavior. In the SPI mechanism, after the buyer’s lie has been challenged, 
the buyer must immediately pay a fine  F B . The buyer is then presented with two 
options. He can either buy the good (receiving  v −  p ˆ ( v ˆ) −  F B ) and “reveal” that he 
has lied, or he can choose not to buy the good (receiving  − F B ) and “reveal” that he 
has told the truth. In the former case, the seller receives  F S as a reward and  p ˆ ( v ˆ) as 
compensation for the good. In the latter case, he receives  − F S . The private cost to 
the buyer of choosing the latter is  v −  p ˆ ( v ˆ) , but the cost to the seller is  p ˆ ( v ˆ) + 2 F S . 
If the buyer receives a psychic reward of  ψ B  λ B (which we explain below in more 
detail) for destroying a unit of the seller’s payoff as punishment for a perceived 
unkind act, he will reject the counter-offer if the following condition holds:
  ψ B  λ B [ p ˆ ( v ˆ) + 2 F S ] ≥ v −  p ˆ ( v ˆ) .
The  left-hand side of this inequality measures the buyer’s  nonpecuniary benefit 
from rejecting the counter-offer and reducing the seller’s payoff, while the  right-hand 
side measures the buyer’s pecuniary cost of doing so. For small lies, this pecuniary 
cost can be very small so that only modest preferences for retaliation are necessary 
to induce the buyer to reject a counter-offer after an appropriate challenge.14
The  nonpecuniary benefit  ψ B  λ B in the discussion above was exogenous. However, 
in online Appendix Section A3, we adapt Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger’s (2004)—
henceforth, DK—solution concept, sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE) to our 
setting. Following DK, we assume that the buyer and seller have commonly known 
 intentions-based reciprocal preferences. We assume that players care positively 
14 For example, a buyer who is challenged after a small lie of  240 must give up only  15 ECU to destroy 
745 ECU from the seller. This implies that the buyer must be willing to give up just over $0.02 to reduce the seller’s 
payoff by $1.
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about their own pecuniary payoffs and, if they perceive hostility, negatively about 
the other player’s pecuniary payoffs. Player  i ’s actions at each stage are chosen to 
maximize his pecuniary payoffs,  π i , minus the product of a retaliation factor and 
player  j ’s pecuniary payoffs:  π i −  ψ i  λ i  π j . The retaliation factor  ψ i  λ i depends on 
his retaliatory type  ψ i , which is the strength of his innate preference for negative 
reciprocity, as well as on how aggrieved he is,  λ i , which captures his perception of 
the other player’s hostility.
We modify the solution concept of DK in two ways. Motivated by the “contracts 
as reference points” literature, which suggests that individuals form beliefs about 
their payoffs based on the contract they sign, we use the payoff generated under the 
efficient outcome as the reference payoff (e.g., in our main experiment, it would 
be  70 for each player). We believe that this reference point is plausible since both 
players know what pricing rule the mechanism design is trying to implement and 
are likely to be aggrieved if they receive a smaller payoff than they would under that 
pricing rule due to an action of the other party.
By choosing the efficient outcome as the reference point and setting the payoffs 
of the buyer and seller to be equal on the  subgame-perfect-equilibrium path, our 
experiment leaves little scope for positive reciprocity to influence the outcome of 
the game. For example, the only direct way for a buyer to be “kind” is to make a 
generous announcement (i.e., one that is above the true value). Such an action would 
have no efficiency consequences, as it would only lead to a  zero-sum transfer from 
the buyer to the seller. In our main treatment, such transfers lead to disadvanta-
geous inequity and are never observed.15 Similarly, sellers also have little scope to 
be “kind” to the buyer, since a high effort choice is already built into the reference 
point, and sellers are therefore already “expected” to provide high effort and not 
challenge a truthful or generous announcement of the buyer. Following the approach 
of Dufwenberg, Smith, and Van Essen (2013), we therefore restrict our attention 
to the case where players have only negative reciprocity, and we bound a player’s 
aggrievement level  λ i ∈ [0, 1] at each stage of the game. The upper bound on  λ i 
normalizes the value of  ψ i  λ i so that  ψ i can be interpreted as the amount player  i is 
willing to pay to reduce player  j ’s payoff when he is maximally aggrieved.
Figure 3 characterizes the set of SREs that exist in our main treatment for differ-
ent retaliatory types of the buyer ( ψ B ) and the seller ( ψ S ). The figure shows that there 
are three critical threshold values of the negative reciprocity parameters, two for the 
buyer ( ψ 
–
 B 
SPI and  ψ ˆ B 
SPI ) and one for the seller ( ψ 
–
 S 
SPI ), that partition the outcome space 
into three regions that are described in more detail below. The figure is drawn for 
the specific set of parameters used in the main SPI treatment, but more generally, 
there always exists Regions I, II, and III that are characterized by the three critical 
threshold values. In particular, for a wide range of parameters, the thresholds sat-
isfy  ψ 
–
 S 
SPI >  ψ 
–
 B 
SPI in any  γ SPI mechanism that  SPE-implements the pricing rule  p due 
to the asymmetric role of fines in the mechanism.
15 As seen in Appendix Section B2, we do observe some generous offers in the  High-Benefits treatment where 
the buyer receives more of the surplus in equilibrium than the seller. However, in an additional treatment, we find 
that these generous reports disappear when truthful reports cannot be challenged, suggesting that they are due to a 
fear of inappropriate challenges rather than altruism or kindness. We also do not observe any evidence of positive 
reciprocity in our treatments where individuals can opt into the mechanism or in the retaliatory seller mechanism 
discussed in the next section.
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The equilibrium outcomes in the three regions of Figure 3 are characterized as 
follows:
 (i) In Region  I,  truth-telling is not an equilibrium outcome. This region 
saliently illustrates the asymmetric role of buyer and seller reciprocity 
because only a small amount of buyer reciprocity ( ψ B >  ψ 
–
 B 
SPI = 0.02 ) 
suffices to be in this region unless there is a large amount of seller reci-
procity (i.e.,  ψ S >  ψ 
–
 S 
SPI = 1.27 ). In this region, sellers are unwilling to 
challenge a buyer’s lie because they know that the buyer will reject the 
counter-offer.
 (ii)  Truth-telling is the unique equilibrium outcome in Region II, but this requires 
a large amount of seller reciprocity (i.e.,  ψ S >  ψ 
–
 S 
SPI = 1.27 ) and a limited 
amount of buyer reciprocity ( ψ B <  ψ ˆ B 
SPI
 = 0.73 ). Intuitively, the asymmet-
ric timing of fines in the SPI mechanism causes the large amount of seller 
reciprocity necessary to be located in this region; only sellers with a large 
amount of reciprocity are willing to challenge buyers’ lies even when they 
know buyers will reject the counter-offer. Therefore, in this region the buyers 
are deterred by sellers’ reciprocity unless they also have a rather high incli-
nation to reciprocate (i.e., if  ψ B >  ψ ˆ B 
SPI
 = 0.73 ).
Figure 3. Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium Outcomes in the Experimentally 
Implemented SPI Mechanism for Different Buyer ( ψ B ) and Seller ( ψ S ) Retaliatory Types
Notes: The figure is drawn under the assumption that the seller’s effort is high, and it considers whether a lie is part 
of an SRE outcome. Along the  45-degree line, both parties’ retaliatory types are the same.
Region II:  Truth-telling is the 
unique equilibrium outcome
Region I:  Truth-telling is not
an equilibrium outcome
Region III: Multiple 
equilibrium outcomes 
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 (iii) Finally,  truth-telling is part of an equilibrium outcome in some but not all 
equilibria in Region III, where both players have rather high levels of rec-
iprocity ( ψ B >  ψ ˆ B 
SPI
 = 0.73 and  ψ S >  ψ 
–
 S 
SPI = 1.27 ). In the equilibria 
involving lies in this region, the seller will challenge the buyer’s lie. The 
reason why lying is nevertheless a part of an SRE outcome is that if buyers 
also have high retaliatory types, then they may be willing to lie and reject the 
seller’s appropriate challenge because doing so will punish an unkind seller.
Although there are no estimates of the distribution of retaliatory types in our 
setting, the results from the experimental literature on ultimatum games is consis-
tent with the claim that most sellers will have a  ψ S <  ψ 
–
 S 
SPI = 1.27 and that the 
majority of buyer–seller dyads are likely to fall into Region I. Translated into an 
 ultimatum-game setting, for example, a responder in the ultimatum game with a 
retaliatory type of  ψ 
–
 S 
SPI would reject an offer of  49  percent of the pie. Such rejections 
are extremely rare. This suggests that negative reciprocity can rationalize the main 
deviations observed in our experiment.16
In online Appendix Section A4, we establish a more general result that explores 
how negative reciprocity impacts SPI mechanisms in general. We consider the set of 
all mechanisms of the type described in Section I that  SPE-implement a  nonconstant 
pricing rule  p under selfish preferences for a given economic environment. We define 
a psychological environment to be a joint probability distribution over retaliatory 
types of the buyer and seller, and we assume that players’ retaliatory types are inde-
pendent. The psychological environment is common knowledge, so players agree on 
the set of feasible retaliatory types as well as on their distribution, and we assume 
that the realization of a player’s retaliatory type is also commonly known.
We say that a mechanism  γ SPI and pricing rule  p are subject to retaliatory imple-
mentation failure if  γ SPI  SPE-implements  p under selfish preferences, and there 
exists a psychological environment in which buyer and seller types are drawn from 
the same distribution and in which, with positive probability, there is no SRE with 
 truth-telling behavior. The following proposition shows SPI mechanisms are subject 
to retaliatory implementation failure.
PROPOSITION 1: Given an economic environment and a  nonconstant pricing rule, 
if  γ SPI  SPE-implements  p , then  ( γ SPI , p) is subject to retaliatory implementation 
failure.
The logic behind Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 3. As described above, for 
a wide range of parameters, the thresholds satisfy  ψ 
–
 B 
SPI <  ψ 
–
 S 
SPI in any  γ SPI mecha-
nism that  SPE-implements the pricing rule  p due to the asymmetries inherent in the 
mechanism. In these environments, there exists a point along the diagonal that lies in 
16 Note that if buyers have disadvantageous inequity aversion, they may also reject counter-offers that would lead 
to a large amount of inequity. Thus, in principle, inequity aversion could also explain buyer rejections. However, it 
does not explain other empirical characteristics of the data. In particular, inequity aversion cannot explain why a fair 
number of sellers challenge small and moderate size lies, even though they correctly predict that such challenges 
will be retaliated against. In our experiment, a seller who exerts high effort and ends up with the disagreement 
payoffs will experience more inequity than if they choose not to challenge a small or moderate lie. Thus, inequity 
aversion would not lead to challenges by the seller. We have thus concentrated on negative reciprocity, which can 
rationalize both buyer and seller behavior across all our treatments.
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Region I where  truth-telling is not part of any SRE, and therefore  ( γ SPI , p) is subject 
to retaliatory implementation failure.
For some economic environments, it may be possible to construct a  γ SPI mecha-
nism in which Region I does not occur along the diagonal. When this is the case, it is 
always possible to construct a psychological environment in which with probability 
at least  1/4 ,  truth-telling is not an SRE outcome. To do so, consider a distribution 
in which parties’ retaliatory types are drawn independently and are  0 with proba-
bility  1/2 and  ψ >  ψ 
–
 B 
SPI with the remaining probability. With probability  1/4 , the 
realization of retaliatory types will be  ψ B = ψ and  ψ S = 0 , and when this is the 
case,  truth-telling is not a SRE outcome.
In this section, we have assumed that parties’ retaliatory types are common 
knowledge. This assumption allowed us to show that reciprocity, by itself, is suffi-
cient to generate behavior that is consistent with many of our experimental results. 
In a previous version of our paper, we also considered behavior under the SPI 
mechanism in a setting in which buyer and seller retaliatory types are drawn from 
a known distribution but where each player’s type is their private information.17 
Incorporating private information in this way allows us to rationalize additional 
features of our data. In particular, it can help explain why sellers challenge small 
lies, and counter-offers are rejected, even in settings in which parties typically 
have moderate retaliatory types.18 When retaliatory types are private information, 
a buyer who has a low type and who would accept the counter-offer may have an 
incentive to mimic a high type by lying. Since both low- and  high-type buyers lie, 
the seller may have an incentive to challenge with positive probability. There may 
therefore exist  mixed-strategy equilibria in which (i) buyers regularly tell small 
lies, (ii) sellers occasionally challenge such lies, and (iii) buyers frequently retal-
iate against challenges of small lies. This pattern of play is observed in the main 
treatment.
V. Toward a  Retaliation-Robust Mechanism
One approach to answering the question of whether there is a mechanism that 
 SRE-implements our pricing rule would be to try to develop a truly  retaliation-robust 
class of mechanisms: ones that implement our pricing rule and would do so under 
any distribution of retaliatory types by eliminating players’ desires or abilities to act 
on their retaliatory preferences. Bierbrauer and Netzer (2016) and Bierbrauer et al. 
(2017) take this approach in a setting in which players have private information 
about  pecuniary-payoff-relevant states in addition to private information about their 
17 The outcomes described in Regions I and II of Figure 3 remain equilibrium outcomes when we relax the 
assumption that retaliatory types are common knowledge. Doing so requires generalizing the SRE solution concept 
to allow for private retaliatory types (see Fehr, Powell, and Wilkening 2018 for details). In particular, if retaliatory 
types are privately known but lie in Region I with probability 1, then  truth-telling is not an equilibrium outcome. If 




or they lie in the rest of Region II with probability 1 (i.e., all sellers have a retaliatory type greater than  ψ 
–
 S 
SPI and all 
buyers have a retaliatory type less than  ψ ˆ B 
SPI
 ), then  truth-telling is the unique equilibrium outcome.
18 As illustrated in Figure  3, when retaliatory types are commonly known, such scenarios occur only in 
Region III, where sellers (buyers) are willing to pay more than $1.27 ($0.73) to reduce their counterparty’s pay-
off by $1. There is substantial empirical evidence that such preferences are rare (Anderson and Putterman 2006; 
Carpenter 2007; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher 2005).
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retaliatory types. They construct a class of mechanisms under which players cannot 
unilaterally affect others’ pecuniary payoffs, so no player can act on his retaliatory 
preferences. If such a mechanism implements a social choice function when players 
do not have preferences for retaliation, then it will do so for any distribution of retal-
iatory types. Bierbrauer and Netzer (2016) show these mechanisms can partially 
implement (i.e., do so in some but not necessarily all equilibria) a class of social 
choice functions that have the “insurance property,” that is, they insure the player 
against others’ retaliatory types.
As we discuss in detail in online Appendix Section A7 (Proposition 4), if a social 
choice function has the insurance property, then any mechanism that implements 
that social choice function must have two properties. Given any candidate equilib-
rium of the game induced by that mechanism, it must be the case that (i) a devia-
tion by the buyer cannot impact the payoff of the seller, and (ii) a deviation by the 
seller cannot impact the payoff of the buyer. Since any action that changes the trade 
price will impact the payoff of the other party, only constant pricing rules (e.g., a 
 fixed-price contract) satisfy the insurance property in our setting. Such contracts are 
unable to fully address the  hold-up problem in many settings.
However, if constant pricing rules cannot address the  hold-up problem, 
Proposition 1 becomes relevant, i.e., the mechanism is subject to retaliatory imple-
mentation failure. This suggests that  nontrivial solutions to the  hold-up problem 
will require a priori information on the intensity of negative reciprocity. In other 
words, it may be possible to mitigate the  hold-up problem in many settings only 
if there is a priori information about the intensity of negative reciprocity, and 
moreover, if it is possible to calibrate a mechanism to this information. Here, we 
explore one such calibration where we alter our existing mechanism in a way 
that uses the sellers’ retaliatory preferences to our advantage. We propose the 
following modified mechanism, which we refer to as the  retaliatory-seller (RS) 
mechanism.
Consider the setting described in Section I, and consider the following mechanism:
 (i) The buyer and seller sign a contract with the arbitrator. The contract spec-
ifies  (a)  an initial price schedule  p( v ˆB ) at which trade may occur, given an 
announcement  v ˆB the buyer makes in stage (iii),  (b)  a  counter-offer schedule 
 p ˆ ( v ˆB ) , and a pair of fines  F B and  F S . The initial price schedule corresponds 
with the pricing rule if  v ˆB = v .
 (ii) The seller chooses effort  e , which determines a distribution over the value of 
the good  v ∈  , which is commonly observed by the buyer and seller.
 (iii) The buyer and seller simultaneously announce  v ˆB ,  v ˆS ∈  . These announce-
ments are commonly observed by the buyer, the seller, and the arbitrator.
 (iv) If  v ˆB =  v ˆS , then trade occurs at price  p( v ˆB ) , and the game ends. If  v ˆB ≠  v ˆS , 
then the seller immediately pays a fine  F S and is given the option to challenge 
the buyer’s announcement. If the seller does not challenge, then trade occurs 
at price  p( v ˆB ) , and the game ends. If the seller challenges, then the buyer pays 
a fine  F B , and play proceeds.
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 (v) The buyer is given a counter-offer  p ˆ ( v ˆB ) . If the buyer accepts the counter-of-
fer and buys, he pays  p ˆ ( v ˆB ) and receives the good, and the seller receives an 
arbitration reward of  F B by the arbitrator.
 (vi) If the buyer does not buy, the seller gives the good to the arbitrator, and it is 
destroyed.
A RS mechanism, which we will denote by  γ RS , is therefore a collection 
 (  p ˆ ( ⋅ ),  F B ,  F S ) consisting of a  counter-offer schedule, a buyer fine, and a seller fine, 
that is designed to implement pricing rule  p( ⋅ ) . The following three conditions are 
sufficient for the RS mechanism to  SPE-implement pricing rule  p( ⋅ ) :
 (a)  Counter-Offer Condition: The buyer prefers to accept any counter-offer for 
which he has announced  v ˆB < v and reject any counter-offer for which he 
has announced  v ˆB ≥ v .
 (b)  Appropriate-Challenge Condition: If  v ˆB ≠  v ˆS , the seller prefers to chal-
lenge announcements  v ˆB < v and not challenge announcements  v ˆB ≥ v .
 (c)  Truth-Telling Condition: The buyer and seller prefer to announce  v ˆB 
=  v ˆS = v rather than to announce any other values.
The first two conditions are similar to the conditions for the SPI mechanism to 
 SPE-implement  p( ⋅ ) . As in the SPI mechanism, the  counter-offer schedule can be 
chosen so that the  Counter-Offer Condition is satisfied, and the fine  F S can be cho-
sen to satisfy the  Appropriate-Challenge Condition. The only condition that differs 
is the  Truth-Telling Condition, which now requires both players to announce the 
true value.
The mechanism is structured so that if  Counter-Offer and  Appropriate-Challenge 
Conditions are satisfied, then there is no SPE in which either player announces a 
value other than  v . To see why, note that there is no SPE in which  v ˆB > v , because 
then the buyer would prefer to announce  v ˆB = v , which will not be challenged and 
would result in a lower price. For a sufficiently high  F B , there is also no SPE in 
which players do not coordinate their announcements (i.e.,  v ˆB ≠  v ˆS ) because then 
the buyer would prefer to deviate by announcing either  v ˆB =  v ˆS , which cannot be 
challenged, or by announcing  v ˆB = v , which will not be challenged. And critically, 
this mechanism does not suffer from the multiple SPE problem: there is no SPE in 
which players coordinate their announcements on a value other than the true value 
(i.e.,  v ˆB =  v ˆS < v ) because then the seller would prefer to announce  v ˆS = v and 
challenge the buyer’s announcement.
Having shown that the RS mechanism  SPE-implements the pricing rule, we 
now highlight why it may also  SRE-implement that pricing rule. The RS mech-
anism is similar to the SPI mechanism but restructures the fines so that the 
seller is fined prior to making his challenge decision. The adjustment of the 
fine has two effects that are likely to increase challenges. First, being fined is 
likely to increase the seller’s willingness to challenge in cases where the buyer 
lied and the seller told the truth, since the buyer’s action reduces the seller’s 
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payoff substantially and will therefore be perceived as unkind. Second, at the 
time the seller decides to challenge, the seller’s fine is sunk in the RS mechanism. 
In contrast, in the SPI mechanism, whether the seller has to pay a fine depends 
on the buyer’s subsequent action. Therefore the incremental loss associated 
with challenging and having the counter-offer rejected is much lower in the RS 
mechanism.
In the online Appendix, we show that reversing the ordering of the fines leads 
to a larger set of psychological environments for which there exists a  truth-telling 
SRE.
PROPOSITION 2: Given an economic environment and a  nonconstant pricing rule, 
if  (i)   γ SPI  SPE-implements  p ,  (ii)   γ RS  SPE-implements  p , and  (iii)   γ SPI and  γ RS use 
the same  counter-offer schedule and fines  F S and  F B , then:
 (a) There exists a psychological environment in which truth-telling is a SRE out-
come of the game induced by  γ RS but not in the game induced by  γ SPI .
 (b) If  truth-telling is a SRE outcome in the game induced by  γ SPI , then  truth-telling 
is also a SRE outcome in the game induced by  γ RS .
We note that Proposition 2 does not establish a dominance result when it comes to 
full  SRE-implementation (i.e.,  truth-telling is the outcome for every SRE) because 
there are psychological environments in which  truth-telling is the SRE outcome of 
every SRE under the SPI mechanism, but there exists a SRE where  truth-telling is 
not the equilibrium outcome under the RS mechanism. This is due to the potential 
for a buyer and a seller with moderate retaliatory preferences coordinating on a 
common lie in stage  (iii) of the RS mechanism. We discuss this issue further in 
online Appendix Section A6.
A. Testing the Retaliatory Seller Mechanism
Based on the theory discussed above, a RS mechanism can induce  truth-telling 
and high effort for psychological environments where sellers have a moderate 
level of reciprocity. We test this hypothesis using a “retaliatory seller mecha-
nism” in the RS Treatment and the RS with  Intensive-Training Treatment. 
In the RS Treatment the standard training protocol was used to make it com-
parable to our initial SPI Treatment which also used a standard training pro-
tocol. In the RS with  Intensive-Training Treatment, we used the intensive 
training protocol where participants play against a computerized opponent prior to 
Phase I.
To make the treatments as comparable to the original treatments as possible, 
our  RS mechanism uses the same price schedule  p( ⋅ ) and  counter-offer schedules 
 p ˆ ( ⋅ ) that we used in the SPI mechanism and was implemented as follows:
 (i) Effort Stage: In the effort stage the seller chooses either high or low effort. 
Low effort generates a good the buyer values at 120 at a cost of 30. High 
effort generates a good the buyer values at 260 at a cost of 120.
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 (ii) The Report Stage: Both parties are informed about the true value of the 
good. Next, both the buyer and the seller make simultaneous reports about 
the goods value:
(a)  v ˆS ∈  V ˆ = {100, 120, …, 260, 280, 300} ;
(b)  v ˆB ∈  V ˆ = {100, 120, …, 260, 280, 300} .
 (iii) The Verification Stage: The reports of the buyer and the seller are compared 
to one another.
(a)  If the reports coincide, trade occurs at a price that is based on the agreed 
upon reports  p( v ˆB ) = 70 + 0.75( v ˆB − 100) .
(b)  If the reports do not coincide, the seller is charged a verification fee 
 F S = 100 and enters into the arbitration stage.
 (iv) The Arbitration Stage: If the seller enters the arbitration stage, the seller 
will have the option to continue arbitration or to exit arbitration.
(a)  If the seller chooses to continue arbitration, the buyer is charged an arbi-
tration fee of  F B = 250 and enters the next stage.
(b)  If the seller chooses to exit arbitration, the two parties trade at 
p( v ˆB ) = 70 + 0.75( v ˆB − 100) .
 (v) The Arbitration Response Stage: If the game enters the arbitration stage, 
the buyer is given a counter-offer that of  p ˆ ( v ˆB ) =  v ˆB + 5 .
(a)  If the buyer accept the counter-offer, the seller is given an arbitration 
reward of  F B and trade occurs at  p ˆ ( v ˆB ) .
(b)  Otherwise trade does not occur but the seller still must pay his or her 
initial production costs.
In comparing the RS Treatment to the SPI Treatment and the RS with 
 Intensive-Training Treatment to the SPI with  Intensive-Training Treatment in the 
first 10 periods where the mechanism was exogenously imposed, we find the fol-
lowing result.
Result 3: (a) In phase 1, when the RS mechanism is imposed, the mechanism sub-
stantially increases the proportion of sellers who exert high effort and the proportion 
of truthful reports relative to the SPI mechanism. This relationship holds regardless 
of the level of training. The RS mechanism with intensive training performs particu-
larly well, with both high effort and truthful reports occurring in roughly 90 percent 
of cases. (b) In phase 2, when subjects are free to dismiss the mechanism, the RS 
mechanism also performs significantly better in terms of the share of groups that 
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achieve the efficient outcome and in terms of individual’s average earnings under the 
mechanism. If subjects dismiss the mechanism their average earnings do not differ 
across treatments.
Figure 4 compares the proportion of sellers who exert high effort and the pro-
portion of groups where the buyer and the seller were both truthful in the first ten 
periods (Phase 1) of the four treatments.19 The 95 percent confidence interval of 
each proportion is shown. As can be seen on the left-hand side, the seller exerts high 
effort in 56.5 percent of cases in the SPI Treatment, 69.5 percent of cases in the 
RS Treatment, 77.5 percent of cases in the SPI with  Intensive-Training Treatment, 
and 91.5  percent of cases in the RS with  Intensive-Training Treatment. The dif-
ference between the SPI Treatment and the RS Treatment is weakly significant in 
a simple probit regression where effort choice is regressed on the treatment vari-
able (  p -value = 0.06). The difference between the SPI with  Intensive-Training 
Treatment and RS with  Intensive-Training Treatment is significant using the same 
test (  p -value = 0.03).
As seen on the right-hand side, both the buyer and the seller reported truth-
fully in 32.4 percent of cases in the SPI Treatment, 52.1 percent of cases in the RS 
Treatment, 62.8 percent of cases in the SPI with  Intensive-Training Treatment, and 
in 89.1  percent of cases in the RS with  Intensive-Training Treatment. Using the 
same probit test described above, the difference between the SPI Treatment and the 
RS Treatment is significant (  p -value < 0.01). Likewise the difference between the 
SPI with  Intensive-Training Treatment and RS with  Intensive-Training Treatment is 
significant (  p -value < 0.01).
While the RS Treatment has 20 percentage points more  truth-telling than the SPI 
Treatment, it is still lower than one might expect for a mechanism that is predicted 
19 In the SPI mechanism, a group is truthful if the buyer announces the true value and the seller does not make an 
inappropriate challenge. In the RS mechanism, a group is truthful if both the buyer and seller report the true value.
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Figure 4. Proportion of Sellers Exerting High Effort and Proportion of Groups  
Where Buyers and Sellers Report Truthfully in Periods  1–10 (Percent)
Note: 95 percent confidence intervals shown.
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to eliminate small lies. In online Appendix Section C2, we graph the distribution of 
buyer and seller lies separated between cases where the seller exerted high and low 
effort. As seen there, we find no apparent pattern of small lies and the buyer reports 
truthfully in 77.9 percent of cases after low effort and in 75.5 percent of cases after 
high effort. This rate of  truth-telling is much higher than those observed by buyers 
in the SPI Treatment where they told the truth only in 30.5 percent of cases after low 
effort and 36.9 percent of cases after high effort. However, the seller reports truth-
fully in only 52.5 percent of cases after low effort and in 75.5 percent of cases after 
high effort. This rate of  truth-telling is much lower than in the SPI Treatment where 
false challenges by sellers are very rare.
The distribution of reports in the RS Treatment suggests that while the mecha-
nism mitigates the impact of reciprocity on effort provision and small lies, it is more 
sensitive to mistakes because both the buyer and the seller must make reports. As 
uncoordinated reports always lead to the seller being fined 100 and also leads to no 
trade in the majority of cases, the compounded error rate also has a large negative 
impact on earnings.
In online Appendix Figure C3, we also report the full distribution of reports in the 
RS with  Intensive-Training Treatment. As can be seen there, the additional training 
eliminates almost all  nontruthful reports for buyers and sellers after high effort. In 
groups where the seller exerts high effort, the buyer reports truthfully in 93.6 per-
cent of cases and the seller reports truthfully in 98.9 percent of cases. The average 
earnings in the first 10 periods of the treatment is 109.9. This is significantly higher 
than the earnings of all other treatments in a pairwise test of means with errors 
clustered at the buyer level (No mechanism benchmark:  p -value = 0.04; all other 
treatments:  p -value < 0.01).
Figure 5 reports the proportion of groups that reach the efficient outcome in the 
first 10  periods (left) and in groups that chose to retain the mechanism in peri-
ods   11–20 (right). As can be seen, in the RS with  Intensive-Training Treatment, 
the efficient outcome is achieved in 85  percent of cases in periods   1–10 and in 
91  percent of cases in periods  11–20 where the mechanism was retained. These 
proportions are significantly greater than in the other treatments using a simple pro-
bit regression with a binary variable that is 1 when a group reaches the efficient 
outcome and 0 otherwise is the dependent variable and this is regressed on the other 
three treatments (  p -value < 0.01 for all  treatment-period combinations).
Figure 6 reports the average earnings of individual subjects in periods  11–20 for 
groups that retain the mechanism (left) and for groups that opted out of the mech-
anism (right). In the RS with Intensive Training treatment, subjects who belonged 
to a group that retained the mechanism earned 57.7 on average, while subjects 
who belonged to a group that dismissed the mechanism received 49.0 on average. 
The difference in average earnings is significant in a simple regression where 
earnings is regressed on a dummy variable that is 1 if a group retains the mecha-
nism and 0 otherwise (  p -value = 0.04). Average earnings in the RS with Intense 
Training treatment is also significantly higher than average earnings in the SPI 
with Intense Training for groups that retained the mechanism (  p -value = 0.02). 
Thus, while the RS mechanism does not fully achieve the efficient outcome, it 
nonetheless improves on efficiency relative to both the SPI mechanism and the 
 no-mechanism benchmark.
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Looking at the right-hand sides of Figure 5 and the left-hand side of Figure 6, it 
is interesting to note that in periods  11–20, the RS Treatment frequently achieves 
the efficient outcome and has relatively high average earnings.20 In these groups, 
 truth-telling occurs in 93 percent of cases. This is not significantly different to the 
 truth-telling rate of 95 percent found in the RS with  Intensive-Training Treatment 
suggesting that after some experience, the RS mechanism always performs rather 
well. In contrast, small lies continue to exist in the SPI with  Intensive-Training 
20 Average earnings in the RS treatment is significantly larger in groups where the mechanism is retained rel-
ative to groups where it is dismissed using the same specification as above (  p -value = 0.04). Average earnings 
in the RS treatment is also significantly larger than average earnings in the SPI treatment in groups that retain the 
mechanism (  p -value < 0.01). There is no significant difference in average earnings when groups that retain the 
mechanism in the RS treatment are compared to groups that retain the mechanism in the RS with Intense Training 
treatment (  p -value = 0.31).
Figure 5. Proportion of Groups Achieving the Efficient Outcome (Percent)
Note: 95 percent confidence intervals shown.
Figure 6. Average Earnings of Individual Buyers and Sellers in Periods  11–20  
When the Mechanism Is Retained and Dismissed (Percent)
Notes: The upper dashed line at 70 shows the predicted average earnings of a buyer or seller at the efficient outcome 
where high effort is predicted while the lower dashed line at 45 shows the average earnings of a buyer or seller with-
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Treatment and the  truth-telling rate is only 74 percent for groups who retain the 
mechanism in periods  11–20.
Given the high levels of efficiency observed in the RS with  Intensive-Training 
Treatment, one would expect that both parties would be willing to use the mecha-
nism when given the chance to  opt in. However, we find little evidence for this.
Result 4: Despite the very high levels of efficiency observed in the Retaliatory 
Seller with  Intensive-Training Treatment, the proportion of buyers who opt out of 
the mechanism is still high.
Figure 7 shows the proportion of sellers (left) and buyers (right) who are willing 
to opt into the mechanism. As can be seen on the left-hand side, sellers opt into the 
mechanism in 84.3 percent of cases in the RS with  Intensive-Training Treatment. 
This is not significantly different from any of the other treatments. As seen on the 
right-hand side of the figure, buyers opt into the mechanism in 51.8 percent of cases. 
This  opt-in rate is not significantly higher than the  opt-in rate observed in the SPI 
with  Intensive-Training Treatment (  p -value = 0.29).
The low  opt-in rates of buyers appears surprising given that when the arbitrator 
was retained, sellers chose high effort in  94.8 percent of cases and reports were 
truthful in 94.5 percent of cases. So perhaps the low acceptance of the mechanism 
is only a temporary phenomenon. In online Appendix Section C3 we show a figure 
that illustrates the time path of buyers’ and sellers’ acceptance of the mechanism 
in the RS treatment with Intense Training in periods  11–20. The figure shows that 
there is a slight upwards trend in sellers’ acceptance of the mechanism starting from 
an initial acceptance rate of roughly 82.5 percent in period 11 and ending with an 
average acceptance rates of 86.0 in the last 5 periods. For buyers we observe a stron-
ger upwards trend from an initial acceptance rate of under 38.5 percent in period 11 
and an average acceptance rates of 60.0 in the last 5 periods. This indicates that 
even during the later periods of the phase buyers have a substantial resistance to the 
mechanism.
In online Appendix Section C3, we show the time path of buyers’ and sellers’ 
earnings in periods  11–20 with and without the mechanism in the RS mechanism 
Figure 7. Proportion of Sellers and Buyers Choosing to Opt into Each Mechanism in Periods  11–20 
(Percent)
Note: 95 percent confidence intervals shown.
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with Intense Training. The figure indicates that the sellers were on average better 
off with the mechanism while the buyers earned roughly the same with and without 
the mechanism. The reason for this is that (i)  a small but  nonnegligible fraction 
of trustful sellers provided high effort without the mechanism, and this is often 
fully exploited by buyers with maximal lies and (ii) in the presence of the mecha-
nism there was still a small probability of disagreements, which resulted in losses.21 
Thus, by opting out, buyers could eliminate the potential for losses and still had a 
chance of matching with a trustful seller that could be exploited.
In this environment, where  risk-neutral and  loss-neutral buyers are basically indif-
ferent between accepting and rejecting the mechanism it takes only a tiny degree of 
risk or loss aversion to induce buyers to opt out of the mechanism. The potential role 
of risk/loss aversion is consistent with the fact that individuals who indicated that 
they are not risk/loss averse in our gambling task, by accepting actuarially fair gam-
bles that involve a 50 percent chance of a loss, were significantly (  p -value = 0.03) 
more likely to participate in the mechanism.
To test whether matching with a trustful seller impacted the buyer’s likelihood 
of opting into the mechanism, we calculated the probability of the buyer opting 
into the mechanism in period  t given that the buyer (i) opted into the mechanism in 
period  t − 1 , (ii) opted out and matched with a seller who exerted low effort, and 
(iii) opted out and matched with a seller who exerted high effort. Buyers who opted 
into the mechanism in period  t − 1 opted into the mechanism in 90.4 percent of 
cases while buyers who opted out of the mechanism in period  t − 1 and matched 
with a seller who put in low effort opted into the mechanism in 18.3 percent of cases. 
By contrast, buyers who opted out of the mechanism in period  t − 1 and matched 
with a seller who put in high effort never opted into the mechanism in the next 
period. The difference in the adoption rate of the mechanism between buyers who 
match with sellers who put in high effort and buyers who match with sellers who put 
in low effort is significant in a random effects GLS regression where a buyer’s  opt-in 
decision in period  t is regressed on a dummy variable that is  1 if the buyer opted out 
of the mechanism in period  t − 1 and a second dummy variable that is  1 if the buyer 
opted out of the mechanism in period  t − 1 and the seller nonetheless exerted high 
effort (  p -value < 0.01).
VI. Conclusion
SPI mechanisms have played a key role in the debate over the foundations and 
the relevance of  incomplete-contracting models. If it were indeed possible to make 
all observable  payoff-relevant information verifiable by third parties, the scope for 
the theory of incomplete contracts would be radically curtailed. In this paper, we 
examined the performance of SPI mechanisms in the context of a  hold-up problem, 
where they yield complete  truth-telling and efficient effort choices if they function 
as predicted.
21 Sellers exerted high effort in 13 of 28 cases in period 11 when the mechanism was dismissed. In comparison, 
only 4 of 19 buyers exerted high effort in the first period of the  No-Mechanism treatment that we used to benchmark 
performance in the absence of a mechanism.
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In contrast to these predictions, however, we find that under the mechanism, 
 truth-telling occurs in only a minority of the cases. In contrast to the predicted SPE 
strategies, sellers are often reluctant to challenge the buyers’ lies. When they do 
challenge, the buyers retaliate by rejecting the counter-offer. The buyers frequently 
anticipate the sellers’ reluctance to challenge, which makes lying worthwhile, and 
the sellers often anticipate the buyers’ retaliatory behavior, which makes refraining 
from challenging worthwhile. The strong deviations from the predicted SPE are thus 
not due to failures of backward induction. Instead, they are a rational consequence 
of buyers’ negative reciprocity. Taken together, this pattern of behavior frequently 
leads to very large monetary losses and, if given the opportunity, the majority of 
trading pairs opt out of the mechanism.
We show that a slightly modified version of the Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium 
(SRE) concept of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) explains the major behav-
ioral patterns. In addition, our theoretical analysis shows that negative reciproc-
ity generally constitutes a fundamental problem for any canonical SPI mechanism 
because there always exists a distribution of reciprocity preferences such that there 
is no  truth-telling SRE with a positive probability.
A key insight of our theoretical analysis is that a small amount of buyer reciproc-
ity prevents the SPI mechanism from functioning properly, but seller reciprocity 
could, in principle, restore its  truth-telling properties. However, due to the specific 
timing of the fines in the SPI mechanism, it takes an implausibly large amount of 
seller reciprocity to achieve this. Based on this insight, we therefore developed an 
alternative mechanism, the  Retaliatory-Seller (RS) mechanism, that reduces the 
sellers’ required reciprocity levels for the existence of  truth-telling SRE outcomes.
We also test the new mechanism under our standard training protocol and under 
an intensive training protocol. Regardless of which protocol we use, the RS mecha-
nism always outperforms the SPI mechanism, and in the RS with Intensive Training 
Treatment, the new mechanism induces  truth-telling by both parties and the efficient 
outcome in 90 percent of the cases. However, the RS mechanism does not meet the 
participation constraint of the buyers because they opt into the mechanism only 
 40–60 percent of the time. This reluctance appears to be due the fact that buyers’ 
expected earnings with the mechanism are not higher than without the mechanism, 
but in the presence of the mechanism, there was still a small probability of large 
losses.
We believe that our study provides strong reasons to take reciprocity preferences 
seriously in mechanism design. Our empirical findings and our theoretical results 
indicate that reciprocity undermines the functioning of SPI mechanisms. In addi-
tion, we have shown that in the  hold-up context only fixed price contracts meet the 
insurance property (i.e., neutralize the impact of reciprocity preferences). Such con-
tracts are however not capable of solving  nontrivial  hold-up problems. Therefore, 
mitigating the  hold-up problem with the help of mechanisms may in many settings 
only be possible if a priori information about the intensity of negative reciprocity 
exists and the mechanisms can be calibrated to this information. We have developed 
one mechanism that is less vulnerable to reciprocity and show that, with sufficient 
training opportunities, it performs well in terms of both  truth-telling and efficiency. 
We believe that this shows the high potential value of combining theory and experi-
ments in developing mechanisms that work.
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